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I. Introduction
Similar to the rest of Japan, two-thirds of Fukushima Prefecture is covered 
with dense forests. As they are distributed quite evenly throughout the 
prefecture, a wide area of forested land was contaminated by radioactive fallout 
during the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Workers in 
the forestry industry and local residents have been advised to stay away from 
forests until a solution is found to make them safe for human health. In other 
words, forests that used to provide people with wood, mushrooms, wild 
vegetables, water for rice paddies, and spiritual comfort suddenly became 
threatening places. Naturally, many of the local people want the forests to be 
returned to the state they were in before the accident as soon as possible. That is 
especially true of people working in Fukushima’s forestry industry, because their 
welfare directly depends on how quickly the forests become safe and trusted 
again.
As explained in greater detail later in the article, there are two main 
approaches to the problem of radioactive contamination of forests. The first is to 
wait for the radioactivity to diminish naturally, as has happened in the forests 
surrounding Chernobyl (Little & Bird, 2013). This will take several years for the 
least contaminated forests and decades for those contaminated by the most 
severe radioactive fallout. However, the only actions required in this scenario 
are to accept the consequences of the accident, learn to live close to “no-go” 
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zones, and be patient.
The second approach is to find the most effective ways to remove 
radioactive materials from forests and start unprecedentedly large-scale 
decontamination works. This would be a much quicker way to reduce radiation 
to acceptable levels, as some experiments conducted in Fukushima have shown 
(JAEA, 2012, pp. 166 –8). However, among other existing challenges, 
decontamination requires substantial financial and human resources that would 
have to be provided by the company that caused the pollution, the state, or 
property owners themselves.
Neither waiting nor active decontamination is an ideal solution for all 
interested parties. The forestry industry is certainly not happy to wait for some 
years for the levels of radiation to decrease naturally and would prefer a quicker 
solution. Local residents do not want to be afraid of radiation spreading from the 
forests into their living environments. On the other side stands the Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the owner of the nuclear power plant, which 
is not keen to take responsibility for the radioactive contamination (Maeda, 
2011). The Japanese government has created policies to cope with the 
consequences of the accident, but it has much more pressing issues to deal with 
than organizing decontamination of vast forest areas. As a result, the question of 
“what to do with the forests” is left unanswered, at the expense of the people for 
whom this limbo causes daily financial and psychological damage.
One way to address this problem is to turn to environmental law and apply 
one of the most widely accepted concepts in the field, namely the Polluter Pays 
Principle (PPP). The PPP can help us answer many difficult questions such as 
“who is responsible and for what?,” “who has to pay for the damage?,” and so 
on. However, because of the rare nature of nuclear accidents, there are many 
issues that the PPP has not been used to address; therefore, analysis of such 
cases is urgently needed.
The goal of this article is to analyze how the PPP has been used in Japan 
after the nuclear accident, what its limitations are, and whether it can be an 
effective tool to provide just compensation for victims of radioactive 
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contamination. The article is organized as follows.  Section II presents the 
current state of Fukushima’s forests, their radioactive contamination, and 
responses to the problem. Section III provides more details about the PPP and its 
importance in the context of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster. 
Section IV discusses how the PPP has been applied in Japan after the nuclear 
accident. I argue that there are three major limitations in the current damage 
compensation policy with respect to the forestry sector: 1) there is no option for 
the forest owners to request forest decontamination; 2) there is no compensation 
for standing forests, only for forest products that are not fit for consumption due 
to their high radiation levels; and 3) there is no system to compensate for 
broader damage done to forests and their users. The final section of the article 
presents concluding remarks.
II. Fukushima’s Forests and Issues Associated with Their 
Radioactive Contamination
Forests in Fukushima Prefecture cover 972,000 ha or 72% of the total land 
area (Fukushima Prefecture, 2010). Private forests account for 57.8% of the 
forests and the rest (42.2%) are national forests. More than one-third of all 
forests (35%) are plantations that need regular human care in order to provide 
high-quality forest products and ecological services. Forest owners make up 
almost 3% of all residents in Fukushima, more than 57,000 in all.
In 2010, Fukushima Prefecture’s annual timber production was 763,000 m3 
or about 4% of all timber produced in Japan (Fukushima Prefecture, 2010), with 
three-quarters of that amount (76%) coming from private forests. Because of the 
accident, in 2011 (the most recent year for which data exist), production fell to 
691,000 m3 or by 9.5% (Fukushima Prefecture, 2013).
Radioactive contamination in Fukushima mainly comes from two cesium 
isotopes —cesium-134 and cesium-137 — that were originally deposited in 
equal amounts (Munro, 2012). Cesium-134 has a half-life of 2.06 years (every 
2.06 years its radioactive potential naturally decreases by half), whereas the 
half-life of cesium-137 is much longer —30.17 years. Because of the natural 
82
decay of cesium-134, the radiation level in Fukushima is falling relatively 
quickly. By 2015-2016, cesium-137 will become the dominant source of 
radioactive contamination and natural decay will slow down substantially (see 
Figure 1).
Figure 1. Reduction of the relative external exposure rate of cesium-134 and
 cesium-137 because of radioactive decay (original ratio 1:1).
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (2011)
At the end of 2011, the radiation exposure of almost 230,000 ha of forested 
land (around 24% of all forests in Fukushima) exceeded 1 mSv/year (Kawasaki, 
2012), which is an acceptable artificial dose for members of the public set by the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (Valentin, 2007, p. 36). 
Because of the natural decay of radioactive materials and their dispersal by wind 
and rain, some less contaminated forests have already crossed the 1 mSv/year 
threshold by now, and it is expected that more forests will do the same in a few 
years (Hiroshi, 2013). However, despite this natural decontamination process, it 
will take decades for some forest areas to become safe for humans. One way to 
hasten these changes is to decontaminate the land by removing dead leaves and 
the top layer of soil, cutting branches, or entirely clear-cutting most 
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contaminated forests.
Both naturally occurring radioactive decay and artificial decontamination 
have numerous advantages and disadvantages that must be considered (see Table 
1).
Table 1. Advantages and disadvantages of natural and artificial forest
 decontamination.
Natural decontamination Artificial decontamination
Advantages •Low operational cost •Comparatively quick solution
•Prevents migration of radioactive 
materials
•Contaminated biomass can be 
used for energy production
•Jobs for local people
Disadvantages •Takes a long time
•Risk of migration of radioactive 
materials
•Risk of forest fires because of poor 
maintenance
•Losses for the forestry industry
•Risk of people visiting forests
•Negative psychological effect for 
local people
•Logistically challenging
•May require repeated procedures
•Radiation risk for workers
•Need for  long- term s torage 
facilities for contaminated soil, 
litter, etc.
•Damage to the forest ecosystem
•Requires many financial resources
Sources: Little & Bird (2013), Hashimoto, Linkov, Shaw & Kaneko (2012), and Hashimoto, Ugawa, 
Nanko & Shichi (2012)
The main difference between natural and artificial decontamination is the 
amount of time and resources required. Waiting for radioactivity to diminish by 
itself costs very little relative to the financial and human resources needed to 
decontaminate vast areas of forest. Official estimates indicate that the budget for 
the current decontamination plan will reach a staggering 11 billion USD, and 
that does not include decontamination of forests (Ministry of the Environment, 
2013a). On the other hand, artificial decontamination can turn forests into a safe 
environment for humans in a few months or years; natural decay will take 
84
decades to have the same effect. This long waiting period means that forest 
owners will suffer losses, as they cannot log trees and sell timber or other forest 
products from their property. In the case of Fukushima, the forest owners were 
advised after the accident to stop their activities and wait for further 
developments, which has been a major disruption for the local forestry industry 
(Kirino, 2011). For these people, making forests safe as quickly as possible (i.e., 
decontaminating them) is the preferred option.
From the standpoint of human safety, decontamination is also a better option 
because it can reduce the risk that radioactive cesium will migrate from forests 
to agricultural fields or living areas. This happens when radioactive materials are 
washed out of the forest with rain or by river water. Forest fires that have the 
potential to widely disperse radioactivity concentrated in biomass are also a 
threat, especially when forests are not maintained properly. Decontamination 
can reduce these risks because contaminated soil, dead leaves, wood, and other 
materials can be stored in special facilities in a controlled environment.
Of course, it is possible to combine these approaches (artificial 
decontamination and waiting for radioactivity to decay naturally) by estimating 
which of these two is needed more and it would be more cost-effective in a 
given area. In fact, the Japanese government has chosen to respond to the 
contamination in exactly this way.
Because Fukushima Prefecture is a relatively densely populated area, 
evacuating residents to escape the negative effects of radiation is not a viable 
option. Instead, large-scale decontamination is being used to turn polluted areas 
back into safe living environments. To systematically organize decontamination 
works, on August 30, 2011, the Japanese Diet adopted the Act of Special 
Measures Concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution (the Act), which 
went into effect on January 1, 2012. Based on this law, the Ministry of the 
Environment (MoE) developed Basic Principles to regulate decontamination. 
According to these principles, contaminated areas are ranked by their importance 
“from the viewpoint of the protection of human health,” which means that places 
with a greater risk of negatively impacting humans are to be decontaminated 
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before those with a lower risk (MoE, 2011). At the top of the list are schools, 
public spaces, houses, and roads. In other words, areas where people (especially 
children) spend most of their time. Next on the list are agricultural fields and 
forested lands that are within 20 m of residential areas. At the bottom of the list 
are uninhabited places such as grasslands and deeper forest areas, as they pose 
little threat to human health.
The responsibility for decontamination is divided between the central and 
local governments. The most contaminated areas close to the Daiichi nuclear 
power plant are administered by the MoE and the remaining areas must be 
handled by local municipalities. In both cases, decontamination plans have to be 
prepared according to the Act (Kawasaki, 2012). Although the cost of all 
activities is now covered by the national government, according to the Act on 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the company responsible for the nuclear 
power plant (TEPCO) must eventually take full financial responsibility (MoE, 
2012). In other words, the current official position of the Japanese government is 
that the PPP has to be used to deal with the damage caused by the accident. I 
will now describe the PPP.
III. The Polluter Pays Principle
From an economic perspective, pollution has long been considered a 
negative externality —a side effect of business operations for which the whole 
society rather than individual polluters must pay. Companies could release 
pollutants into the environment without fear that they would have to pay for the 
damage. For this reason, pollution was not included in production costs, which 
meant that the invention of less polluting methods of production was not 
incentivized by the market. The PPP is a way to resolve this problem and 
encourage companies to include the costs of pollution in their accounting and 
final product pricing.
Central to the PPP is the idea that the cost of pollution must eventually be 
covered by the person that caused it. The goal is not only to make companies 
pay for pollution damage (such as costs for cleanup or decontamination works), 
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but also to encourage them to find ways to prevent pollution in the first place, or 
at least to reduce it through cleaner business practices (Bayliss & Langley, 2003, 
pp. 8–9; Omar, 2008, p. 336).
Several issues arise when the PPP is applied, the main one being that 
companies can simply pass pollution control costs onto consumers by increasing 
the prices of their products (Narayana, 2011). To prevent that from happening, 
the market has to be competitive enough to allow consumers to switch to other 
similar products and create a higher demand for less dangerous substitutes 
(Louka, 2006, p. 449). In the case of electricity production in Japan, the 
existence of regional monopolies by utility companies means that consumers 
cannot choose one company over another. This allows TEPCO to raise electricity 
rates to offset pollution damage compensation claims. In such situations, the 
PPP can become the CPP—the Consumer Pays Principle.
The PPP first emerged as an international environmental norm in 1941 when 
the US won the Trail Smelter dispute against Canada. The smelter, which was 
located in the southern part of British Columbia, produced a large amount of 
smoke rich in sulfur dioxide that caused damage to surrounding agricultural 
lands and forests. Landowners across the Canada–US border complained about 
the pollution and eventually the company that owned the smelter had to pay 
compensation to the landowners to cover the damage (Hussen, 2004, p. 136).
Some decades later, the PPP was mentioned for the first time in a 
multilateral agreement signed at the Stockholm Conference in 1972. Article 21 
of the Declaration on the Human Environment states that countries have to 
“insure that activities within their own jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.” In the same year, the Council of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) released the Recommendation on 
Guiding Principles for Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, which 
provided a more detailed description of the PPP.
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and 
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control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental 
resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and investment is 
the so-called ‘‘Polluter-Pays Principle.’’ The Principle means that the 
polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the above-mentioned 
measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the environment is 
in an acceptable state. In other words, the cost of these measures should 
be reflected in the cost of goods and services which cause pollution in 
production and/or consumption. (Article 4)
In 1975, the Recommendation was supplemented by a document that 
explains how the PPP has to be implemented (OECD, 1975). It states that the 
meaning of “pollution” and “acceptable state” of the natural environment must 
be defined by each state according to their individual characteristics and 
circumstances. In some cases, this is done by creating a regulation with a list of 
pollutants and their maximum allowed discharge to the environment, such as the 
Air Pollution Control Act in Japan, which regulates car exhaust emissions.
In other cases, instead of being specific about each pollutant, laws provide 
definitions of the types of environmental damage for which polluters must be 
responsible. In other words, it does not matter whether certain levels of pollution 
are breached; the most important issue is whether the pollutants caused any 
damage. An example of such a regulation is the Environmental Liability 
Directive (2004/35/CE) of the European Union (EU), which was adopted in 
2004. It lists three types of damage to the natural environment: 1) damage to 
species and habitats; 2) damage to water; and 3) damage to land. The Directive 
defines pollution in terms of its effect on the environment and human health 
rather than asking whether the polluter adhered to specific levels of permissible 
contamination (Bergkamp & Goldsmith, 2013, pp. 32–6). As will be explained 
later and exemplified by the Minamata disease case, Japan also endorses this 
kind of regulation.
The PPP is now widely accepted at both the national and international level 
(Kiss & Shelton, 2007, p. 95; Larson, 2005; Sadeleer, 2002, pp. 21 –33). It is 
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part of the 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources; it was discussed during the Rio Conference in 1992 and included in 
the final declaration (“the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of 
pollution”, Principle 16); it is one of the pillars of the environmental policies of 
the EU; and it is part of the national environmental laws of many developed 
countries.
In Japan, the first major applications of the PPP occurred from 1971 to 1973, 
when Japanese courts ruled in favor of pollution victims’ claims (Broadbent, 
1999, p. 126). Among these victims were people suffering from Minamata 
disease, or acute mercury poisoning. The company that released mercury into 
the environment was ordered to cover the damage to the people who were found 
to have symptoms of Minamata disease. Despite the financial compensation 
some patients received in 1973, the process of deciding who was or was not a 
victim and how much compensation should be has been surrounded by 
controversy —even to this day—which shows that the implementation of the 
PPP is not a smooth process (George, 2001; Yoneyama, 2012).
With one exception, the PPP has not been applied on a large scale in Japan 
since the early 1970s. The lone exception is the current compensation 
mechanism for damage caused by radioactive pollution following the Fukushima 
accident.
IV. The PPP and the Accident in Fukushima
The first question that must be asked in the case of the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power accident is,  who is the polluter? The answer seems 
straightforward, TEPCO, the owner of the plant, which had to examine the 
possibility of such an event occurring and take all necessary steps to prevent it. 
Such responsibilities are supported by Article 3 of the Act on Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage adopted in 1961, which says that the company responsible for 
the plant in which an accident happens “shall be liable for the damage.” 
However, the Article adds that liability cannot be required “in the case where the 
damage is caused by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.” 
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Whether the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami fall under this clause was at the 
center of many discussions right after the disaster. Much to TEPCO’s 
disappointment, the Japanese government took the stance that 3/11 was not an 
exceptional disaster, and on July 19, 2012, Tokyo District Court ruled that 
asking TEPCO to be responsible for the damage was a legal decision (Takano, 
2012).
The next question is, what is considered the damage for which TEPCO must 
pay? As contamination by radioactive materials is excluded from environmental 
laws in Japan, such as the Air Pollution Control Law, the Soil Contamination 
Countermeasures Law, the Agricultural Land Soil Pollution Prevention Law, the 
Water Quality Pollution Control Law and others, there is no legal basis for 
defining radioactive pollution as damage in the existing laws (Mori, 2012). 
Therefore, the government adopted a set of ad hoc regulations, the Interim 
Guidelines on Determination of the Scope of Nuclear Damage, released in 
August 2011, which form the basis for the majority of current damage claims 
made by individuals and companies.
The following types of damage will qualify for compensation to a certain 
extent: damage that was a consequence of a government instruction, etc. 
issued on reasonable grounds to protect the life or health of citizens from 
the accident; damage arising through reasonable avoidance behavior in 
markets; and indirect damage necessarily arising in third parties as a result 
of these other two types of damage having arisen. (Part 2, Section 1)
In other words, damage is considered to originate mainly in government 
policies that had a negative impact on local people’s lives, and changes of 
consumers’ attitudes toward products made in Fukushima and other 
contaminated regions. In those cases in which local people decided to leave their 
homes or stop doing business voluntarily, any damage they suffered does not 
qualify for compensation because it did not result from something the 
government told them to do.
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These differences in defining damage are also important for the forestry 
industry. Right after the accident, the government ordered people to evacuate 
from the most polluted areas and advised forest owners outside of the evacuation 
zone to suspend their activities because the level of radioactive contamination of 
forests was unknown. However, in the latter case, it was only an advisory, not a 
prohibition, so the government was not forcing the forest owners to alter their 
usual practices. Later, when it became clear that radiation exposure exceeded the 
acceptable artificial dose for members of the public (1mSv/year) in vast areas of 
forests, again the government did not require forestry activities to stop until 
radiation levels dropped below the acceptable limit (naturally or artificially). As 
a result, the forest owners who stopped their usual forestry work out of fear of 
radiation cannot ask for compensation because their damage was not a 
consequence of a governmental instruction.
However, there are other government regulations that are important in the 
context of forests. As Fukushima is an important producer of mushrooms in 
Japan, many forest owners supply small logs for farmers to grow shiitake and 
other types of mushrooms. In addition, sawmills sell tree bark and sawdust to be 
used in agriculture as compost or mulch. Because both of these uses of wood are 
directly related to food, more stringent radioactivity requirements are applied. 
There are numerous cases in which forest owners were not allowed to sell forest 
products because they exceeded existing limits. As these requirements were set 
by the government, such lost revenues should qualify as damage and be eligible 
for compensation. So far, a number of forest associations in Fukushima 
Prefecture have used this opportunity and made claims that they lost more than 
43 million USD in revenues in 2011 –2013 (Fukushima Minpo, 2013b; 
Fukushima Minyu, 2013).
Currently, there are not signs that timber itself is contaminated by 
radioactive materials to such a level that it could not be used for housing or 
other purposes. This is because only part of the cesium that fell in the forests 
was absorbed by trees, and only some of the absorbed cesium has penetrated 
into the deeper layers of the wood. Decontamination could help remove a 
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substantial amount of cesium from the forests and prevent it from being trapped 
in tree trunks. Delaying decontamination efforts could worsen the situation. 
According to research carried out in Chernobyl, radiation is constantly absorbed 
by trees and it reaches peak levels after 10 to 20 years (Tonosaki, 2013).
As already noted, the government has no plans to start large-scale 
decontamination of forests in Fukushima, except for forested land that is within 
20 m of residential areas. Data collected by the MoE show that progress is slow; 
as of September 2013, only one-third of this type of land has been 
decontaminated (MoE, 2013b). As radiation in the rest of the forests is left to 
diminish naturally, we can expect forest owners to make repeated claims to be 
compensated for lost revenue until their forest products are proven to comply 
with safety regulations set by the state. The Interim Guidelines recognized the 
possibility of such a situation.
With respect to those types of damage that might arise on an ongoing 
basis, such as evacuation expenses, business damage, or damage due to 
incapacity to work, the criteria for determining an end date for these types 
of damage will present difficulties. […] The Committee will examine 
those types of damage for which this is not the case at a future time as 
necessary, in keeping with how events progress. (Part 2, Section 2)
The way in which damage is currently defined reveals several limitations in 
the implementation of the PPP, the most serious one being that alternative ways 
of dealing with contamination fall outside of the official framework. For 
example, the people of Fukushima have expressed their support for forest 
decontamination works and submitted written demands to the MoE to begin 
decontamination work (Higa, 2012). However, their demands were denied, as 
forests are currently at the bottom of the priority list. Clearly, this is not 
consistent with the PPP, as the owners of polluted forests should be able to 
demand that TEPCO pay for cleaning up the contaminants. In fact, TEPCO is 
already paying for the decontamination of both private and public spaces in 
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Fukushima. Nevertheless, it is not fair that forest owners must wait; some of 
them may have to wait so long that their forests could become clean naturally 
due to radioactive decay. Allowing polluters to postpone their liability for 
several years should not be acceptable if the PPP is to be applied.
Another limitation is that, to be compensated for lost revenues, forest 
owners must conduct their usual forest activities in contaminated forests, which 
might be detrimental to their health. This is because a claim for lost revenue can 
only be made if the final product is found to have radioactivity higher than 
allowed levels. Even more than two and a half years after the accident, there are 
still no official criteria regarding how forest owners can evaluate their forests for 
compensation. In other words, people in the forestry industry face a dilemma: to 
continue their usual business in contaminated forests and be compensated for 
production that is not fit for consumption, or stop their business and face the 
possibility that they might not be compensated at all. Even if forest owners 
choose the first option and their products are refused, they have to store them 
somewhere, as there are no set rules about how to dispose of such products and 
who should pay for the disposal. For example, different facilities that belong to 
Fukushima’s forest associations have accumulated tens of thousands of tones of 
radioactive tree bark and they are worried about whether, in addition to lost 
revenue, they will be compensated for the cost of storing the material 
(Fukushima Minpo, 2013a).
The third limitation is that the existing implementation of the PPP is 
restricted to economic activities and does not cover broader damage to the 
forests and their users. As many people in Fukushima live in close proximity to 
forests, they collect wild forest plants and mushrooms for their personal use, or 
they use forests for recreational purposes. Fear of radioactive contamination or 
official warnings in some areas (Asahi Shimbun, 2013; Shimada, 2013) to 
refrain from eating and selling wild plants and spending time in forests has 
prevented many people from going into the forests. Although TEPCO should be 
held responsible for such negative consequences, they are not included in the 
definition of damage set by the government.
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These three limitations show that the current application of the PPP does not 
fully cover pollution damage and that the official regulations set by the Japanese 
government reduce TEPCO’s liability to the forest owners and the residents of 
Fukushima in general. People who feel they were damaged by the accident, but 
whose cases are not covered by the compensation guidelines, can submit their 
case to the court. This has been done by people who voluntarily left their homes 
because they feared that radiation might have a negative effect on their family 
members, especially their children. However, the outcome of such litigation is 
not clear and the process is costly. As a result, the forest owners have to hope 
that their situation is not simply forgotten by the state and that all losses will be 
justly compensated in the future.
V. Conclusion
The forestry industry in Fukushima is in a difficult position because of the 
radioactive contamination that was spread over large areas during the accident. 
Forests inside the evacuation zone can neither be used for timber production nor 
properly maintained. Because forests are being undermanaged, there are fears 
that they will lose both their economic value and their ecological value (such as 
preventing landslides). Meanwhile, outside the evacuation zone, the forestry 
industry has been damaged by warnings about radioactive pollution, tests that 
showed that their products were not suitable for consumption, and distrust 
among consumers about the safety of Fukushima’s forests, all of which has led 
to a drop in prices.
There is no quick and easy way to repair the damage. Although the 
government has declared that TEPCO is liable for the financial costs of the 
accident, it has made regulations that leave the nuclear power plant owners only 
partly responsible for economic damage. As a result, forestry issues are not on 
an equal footing with issues concerning human environments or agriculture. 
More than two and a half years after the accident, there are still no criteria about 
how damage to standing forests can be evaluated, no plans to start 
decontamination, and no flexibility for individual forest owners to decide which 
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type of damage restoration is appropriate for their forest.
The situation in Fukushima raises broader questions about how the PPP can 
be implemented in large-scale accidents, or whether its implementation is 
feasible at all in such cases. As TEPCO already finds itself in a very difficult 
financial position, implementing a comprehensive compensation mechanism for 
forest damage may well be too much for the company to manage; the outcome 
would be that costs for pollution damage are eventually paid by the forest 
owners themselves or covered by taxpayers’ money. If that occurs, the difficulty 
in applying the PPP in Fukushima’s case will be an additional strong argument 
against the use of nuclear power.
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<Summary>
Linas Didvalis 
The forestry industry in Fukushima is in a difficult position because 
radioactive contamination was spread over large areas during the accident at the 
Daiichi nuclear power plant. Forests inside the evacuation zone cannot be used 
for timber production, nor can they be properly maintained. Outside the 
evacuation zone, the forestry industry has been damaged by warnings about 
radioactive pollution, tests that showed their products were not suitable for 
consumption, and distrust among consumers about the safety of Fukushima’s 
forests, all of which has led to a drop in prices.
There is no quick and easy way to repair the damage. Although the 
government has pledged to implement the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) by 
declaring that the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) is liable for the 
financial costs of the accident, governmental regulations only require the owner 
of the nuclear power plant to be responsible for certain economic costs, with the 
rest to be left for future consideration. As a result, forestry concerns are not on 
an equal footing with human environments or agriculture. Two and a half years 
after the accident, there are still no criteria for how to evaluate damage to 
standing forests, no plans to start forest decontamination, and no flexibility for 
individual forest owners to decide which type of damage restoration is 
appropriate for their forest.
In this article, I argue that implementation of the PPP for the radioactive 
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contamination of Fukushima’s forests has several major limitations. These 
limitations must be overcome if just compensation is to be made to the 
forest owners, workers in the forestry industry, and the residents of 
Fukushima. However, as TEPCO already finds itself in a very difficult 
financial position, implementing a comprehensive compensation mechanism 
for forest damage may well be too much for the company to manage; the 
outcome would be that pollution damage compensation is eventually paid 
by the forest owners themselves or covered by taxpayers’ money. If that 
occurs, the difficulty in applying the PPP in Fukushima’s case will become 
an additional strong argument against the use of nuclear power.

